10 January 2011

IMF dialogue with LH to continue ... if the government permits

On 14 December 2010, La'o Hamutuk wrote a letter to the IMF updating and augmenting some of the observations and findings in their recent “Report on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC)—Fiscal Transparency Module” and “Public Financial Management—Performance Report” on Timor-Leste.

We wrote "As the (IMF) reports point out, there are some strengths and many weaknesses in budgetary and planning processes here. We appreciate your frank discussion of these issues, especially regarding the shortcomings in accountability and planning.
    "Unfortunately, since your team visited last January, a number of things have deteriorated. The situation in Timor-Leste changes quickly, and the past ten months have seen a mid-year budget revision, a shortened calendar for enacting the annual state budget, and a reduction in the amount of information shared with the public. Several imminent legislative and budgetary actions – including extra-budgetary funds, new autonomous institutions and revisions to the Petroleum Fund Law – will further undermine fiscal transparency and accountability if they are enacted. ..."  Our five-page letter described recent developments, corrected erroneous or outdated information, and filled in some gaps in the IMF reports.

In January, the IMF wrote back: "Thank you very much for your in-depth review... The content of your letter is very useful for us in further advising the government on strengthening fiscal transparency and the public financial management system in Timor-Leste. ...
   "We very much appreciate La'o Hamutuk's constructive input and dialogue on public financial management issues. With your government's permission, we hope to continue that dialogue in coming years."

La'o Hamutuk will continue to share information with the IMF, the public and others without asking for permission from the government of the day. The right to do this is enshrined in Articles 40, 41, 46 and 48 of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. We hope that many people and institutions will speak up about important public issues, and not be deterred by the increasing tendency of some officials to "shoot the messenger" who provides information that they would rather nobody knows about.

05 January 2011

LH responds to Parliament's questions on 2011 budget

At the 15 December Parliamentary hearing of Committee C on the 2011 State Budget, the Committee asked La'o Hamutuk to add to our submission on a few topics. On 4 January, we wrote a letter, abridged here.

The budget for the electric grid will not meet contractual obligations.
In our submission, La’o Hamutuk encouraged Parliament to ask the Government for cost projections for multi-year capital projects in the Infrastructure Fund. The next day, the Ministry of Finance gave Parliament Budget Book 6, listing expenditures by project through 2015.

By far the most costly project is to electrify Timor-Leste: the generating stations at Betano and Hera and national distribution grid. According to Book 6, the Government will ask Parliament to approve the following expenditures (in thousands of U.S. dollars):
2010(ref)        $60,000
2011            $163,700
2012            $261,300
2013            $111,000
2014                   0
2015                   0
Total 2010-2015 $596,000
On 15 September , the Government forced CNI22 to subcontract the power stations to the Indonesian company Puri Akraya Engineering, increasing the cost by $261,548,746.  The cost will grow significantly higher when CNI22 implements the Government’s directive to subcontract much of the power grid , and when essential items omitted from the original plan (such as jetties for unloading the fuel) are included.

According to the ELC/Bonifica’s October 2010 Monthly Progress Report,  Timor-Leste is committed to the following payment schedule:
2010(ref)       $124,681
2011            $380,000
2012            $115,931
2013            $113,431
2014            $  3,000 (to CNI22 for management and operation)
2015            $  3,000 (continues annually through 2017)
Total 2010-2015 $740,043
In summary, the Government is legally obligated to pay $116,300,000 more in 2011 alone than Parliament has been asked to approve. We suggest that Parliament ask Government to amend its budget proposal to include this commitment so that you can make more informed decisions.

Some state organs pay more to advisors than to their own personnel.
Some state institutions rely extensively on Timorese and international advisors and consultants who are paid much more than public servants. Although some of these costs are paid by donors, many are Timor-Leste’s own money. We highlight organs whose allocation for “705 Professional Services” is more than for salaries and wages. These 13 organs receive only 6% of the total salary budget, but they will receive 56% of the Professional Services allocation.
Organ                          Prof.Serv.Budget   Salary Budget
State Sec. for Natural Resources   1,200             220
State Sec. for Security              337              72
President of the Republic          2,104             500
State Sec. for Council of Mins.    1,212             306
Whole of Government                  171              50
Prime Minister & Council of Mins.  9,400           3,008
Public Service Commission            648             298
Courts                             1,051             590
State Sec. for Energy Policy         277             181
Prosecutor-General                   933             699
State Sec. for Promotion of Equality 234             205
State Sec. for Defense               228             207
Min. Tourism, Commerce and Industry  999             916
Although some “Professional Services” costs are hidden subsidies, most go to high fees to individuals. We hope that Parliament will look into which are necessary and appropriate. This is especially important now, because the Government hopes to create several new agencies soon which will be exempt from civil service salary rules.

Overspending last year’s ESI in 2011.
President Manuel Tilman asked for La’o Hamutuk’s thoughts on using $140.9 million of the treasury balance from the end of 2010 to fill the deficit in the proposed 2011 budget. This is the only way the Government can pay for $985 million in 2011 expenditures without withdrawing more than the (greatly increased) Estimated Sustainable Income from the Petroleum Fund.

La’o Hamutuk’s submission to Committee C on the 2010 Rectification Budget explained that transferring $311 million above the ESI from the Petroleum Fund during 2010 for the purposes in the budget would violate the Petroleum Fund Law. We wrote that “We do not understand how increasing the treasury balance is ‘in the long-term interests of Timor-Leste.' ”  Our submission last month on the 2011 State Budget said that the $140.9 million being carried over from last year to this year should be considered as coming from the Petroleum Fund.

La’o Hamutuk believes that the Petroleum Fund law requires that money transferred from the Petroleum Fund for a particular year’s budget must be used during that year for the purposes cited in that year’s budget documents. Article 7.2 of the Petroleum Fund Law refers to the “amount transferred from the Petroleum Fund for a Fiscal Year (O montante total das transferências do Fundo Petrolífero para cada Ano Fiscal),” not “in a Fiscal Year.” This makes it clear that the money transferred should be expended during the Fiscal Year for which it was authorized. If some has not been spent by the end of the year it was appropriated for, it should be returned to the Fund.

Consequently, the requested transfer from the Petroleum Fund in the proposed 2011 budget exceeds the (imprudently optimistic) estimate of the sustainable income by $140.9 million, and the Government must provide the information required by Article 9 of the Petroleum Fund Law.

The Government’s interpretation of the Budget and Financial Management Law regarding Special Funds would undermine Parliament’s Constitutional authority.
Articles 32.5 and 32.6 of Law No. 13/2009 on Budget and Financial Management state that expenditures from Special Funds require authorization from the Minister of Finance, and that Parliament must have previously been given estimates of revenues and expenditures for the Special Fund within the fiscal year.

The proposed 2011 State Budget Law includes general lists in Articles 9.2-9.3, with a little more information in Annexes II-B and II-C . However, this is insufficient to allow Parliament to decide on more than $350 million in expenditures during this year alone.

Budget Book 6 provides additional information about estimated expenditures from the Infrastructure and Human Capital Development Funds, although we believe that it should be more specific and detailed.

Parliament should amend Article 9 of the proposed Budget Law to incorporate the list in Budget Book 6 as part of the law, stating that the Government must inform Parliament in advance of any changes to that list, either between projects or from one year to another. If this amendment is not made, Parliament cannot fulfill its responsibility to approve “a breakdown of the revenues and expenditures of the State” and will violate Articles 145.1 and 145.2 of the Constitution of RDTL

The Infrastructure Fund is a dangerous precedent and premature expenditure.
President Tilman also asked our views on the $317 million allocated the Infrastructure Fund.  These are explained in our December submission to Committee C, and further elaborated above. In summary, we urge Parliament not to approve the Infrastructure Fund until it has debated and ratified the National Strategic Development Plan, and until the mechanisms to implement the Plan and manage the Fund are in place. It would be premature to appropriate so much money without clear legal processes to ensure that it will be managed well and spent wisely to advance the interests of the people of Timor-Leste.

21 December 2010

Information keeps coming ... Enjoy the holidays!

As we near the end of 2010, La'o Hamutuk has posted several interesting new documents, which we are sharing with our holiday wishes for all citizens and supporters of Timor-Leste.

On 15 December, we asked Parliament not to approve the new Infrastructure Fund in the 2011 budget  without receiving a list of proposed annual expenditures for multi-year capital projects. The next day, the Ministry of Finance provided a list to Parliament, and we scanned and translated it (also Portuguese) and added it to our web pages on the 2011 state budget. Unfortunately, it raises more questions than it answers.


We asked Parliament to delay approving the Infrastructure Fund until they had debated, amended and enacted the National Strategic Development Plan. Although the plan itself is still under wraps (we published a leaked draft last May), we recently obtained the $3 million contract with PT DSI Makmur Sejahtera for "Strategic Development Plan Consulting Services" which the PM signed in September 2009 and paid last August (invoice). We added this contract to our web page on the Plan, as well as the contract's Terms of Reference and job descriptions for Key Personnel.

Finally, our recent exposure of the huge delays and cost overruns of the heavy oil power plants and national electricity grid provoked public interest and official dishonesty, as described on our just-updated web page.  We just posted the next monthly report from the supervising consultant. It shows that the project fell further behind in October, when only 11 towers were erected. At that rate, it will take until 2027 to finish. The consultant is alarmed by poor quality work and slow performance by Chinese Nuclear Industry Company No 22 (CNI22).  Although the Government ordered CNI22 to subcontract the construction of the Hera and Betano power plants to Puri Akraya Engineering (the contract was signed on 15 September, increasing the project cost by $250 million), Puri Akraya hadn't started work by the end of October, while they waited for advance payment.

The revised payment schedule obliges Timor-Leste to pay CNI22 and PAE $380 million in 2011 alone, a figure which will increase more when the transmission lines are subcontracted and "additional works not originally foreseen in the contract such as the Jetty to unload and pump the Heavy Fuel Oil to the tanks and all administrative buildings" are included.  However, the budget the Government submitted last month appropriates only $166 million during 2011. Nevertheless, the Government paid CNI22 on schedule throughout 2010, even as the work lags further and further behind.

Boas Festa Natal no Haksolok Tinan Foun!

15 December 2010

LH Submission to Finance Comm. on 2011 State Budget

Juvinal Dias and Charles Scheiner testify to Committee C
La’o Hamutuk made a previous submission to Parliament’s Agriculture and Natural Resources Committee (also Tetum). This current submission to the Economics Committee explores some issues we discussed earlier more deeply. In addition, it contains new sections on
  • The proposed revision of the Petroleum Fund Law threatens fiscal sustainability.
  • The national electric project is much more expensive than it appears.
  • Parliament and the public must have access to full information.
The following is an abridged version of our submission. See the web version for graphics and links, or download the PDF version (also Tetum) for printing. Click for more information on the budget, including documents and analysis (also Tetum).

13 December 2010

Heavy Oil project delayed, over budget, unsafe and ill-managed

Since 2008, Timor-Leste’s Government has pursued the dream of cheap, reliable electricity for the entire nation. The construction of heavy oil-fueled generation stations and a nation-wide high-voltage transmission lines is by far the most expensive project Timor-Leste has ever undertaken. The Government promised to provide 24-hour electricity in all district capitals by the end of 2009, and now hopes to achieve this by the end of 2011. But it is not happening.

From the beginning, this project has been characterized by bad planning, dubious procurement procedures, incompetent contractors, illegal practices, poor oversight, and lack of transparency and accountability. La’o Hamutuk has written about this many times, and we are sad to report that reality is even worse than we had feared.

La'o Hamutuk has obtained the confidential September 2010 Monthly Progress Report from the Italian joint venture Electroconsult and Bonifica, SpA” (EB) which the Government hired in July 2009 to supervise Chinese Nuclear Industry Company No. 22 (CNI22). The Government had contracted CNI22 six months earlier, but they were implementing the project without any clear specifications, valid tender, environmental impact analysis or public consultation. In response to criticism that the government was not managing the project effectively, Timor-Leste began paying EB $2 million per year as a consultant to oversee the project.

The report describes an escalating disaster in performance, implementation, environment and safety, and reveals that the Government has already re-assigned responsibility for the power stations to another company, nearly doubling the cost of the entire project. Here are a few of the most important issues:

The project is way behind schedule, and EB is very frustrated with the slowness and unresponsiveness of CNI22. EB says it “does not spare any effort” to press the Chinese company to speed up progress which they say is “below the satisfactory level required” to meet the 31 December 2011 completion date.

The power plants have been removed from CNI22’s responsibility, at great expense. During September, the only work done on the Hera generating station was applying asphalt on the area where oil tanks will be place. Virtually nothing has been done at Betano, although the project timeline says work was to have begun in June 2010.

The Government decided to “cancel" the Hera and Betano power plants "from CNI22’s contract.” Construction of these generating stations was re-contracted to “the Indonesian company Puri Akraya Engineering Limited” on 15 September 2010. La’o Hamutuk’s internet research on “Puri Akraya” turned up only that the name was newly registered with the Hong Kong Companies Registry on 4 August 2010. Five weeks later, Timor-Leste awarded them this huge contract to “do the supply, installation, commissioning and operation of 15 Generating Sets manufactured by Wartsila of Finland.”

Reassigning the contract for the generating stations, together with design changes, quadruples their cost from $91 million to $353 million. EB’s estimate of total project cost is now $629 million, nearly double the original $367 million CNI22 price. If schedule slippages continue and most of the transmission lines are also subcontracted, the costs will be far higher.

Construction of the national electric grid is going extremely slowly, with only 1.2% of the towers having been erected so far, nearly all between Hera and Dili. EB notes “As discussed many time, the Contractor must, in every single calendar day, complete a minimum of” four excavations, four concrete foundations, and four tower erections “including tightening of bolts.” Most of the routes have not even been surveyed, and land disputes have caused a number of problems.
.
Segment
Kilometers
Towers needed
Towers erected
Concrete foundations poured
Earth excavated
Status
Hera-Dili
10
30
23
27
28
Construction underway
Dili-Liquica
37
87
0
2
24
Excavation underway
Hera-Manututo
41
92
7
40
51
Construction underway
Manatuto-Baucau
50
131
0
24
46
Foundations underway
Baucau-Viqueque
64
96
0
0
0
Survey in process
Baucau-Lospalos
53
118
0
0
0
Survey being finished
Liquica-Maliana
63
112
0
0
0
Survey done, design in process
Maliana-Suai
n.a.
n.a.
0
0
0
Field survey started
Suai-Cassa-Betano
n.a.
n.a.
0
0
0
No work done
Betano-Viqueque
n.a.
n.a.
0
0
0
Survey done, design in process
Viqueque-Lospalos
n.a.
n.a.
0
0
0
Starting field survey
Total
630
2,400
30 (1%)
103 (4%)
149 (6%)


The Government directed CNI22 to find other companies to build the most problematic parts of the national grid. CNI22 hoped to sign a contract in early October with the DCP company from Surabaya for the Liquica-Maliana-Suai segment. CNI22 was also talking with PT Karya Logam Agung from Jakarta about Suai-Cassa-Betano-Viqueque, and the Government has asked them to find a third subcontractor for Viqueque-Lospalos.

Only one substation is being worked on. Although the foundation for the Dili substation is 80% complete, virtually no construction has been done on the substations planned for Manatuto, Baucau, Lospalos, Liquica, Maliana, Suai, Cassa and Viqueque.

Hardly any Timorese workers are employed. In January 2009, the Prime Minister told Parliament that “this project will in itself create over 20,000 jobs already in 2009,” but by 28 May 2010, CNI22 had hired only 155 Timorese workers. The Government is “very unhappy” about this and has threatened to stop issuing visas to Chinese workers and to require CNI22 to employ four Timorese workers for every Chinese. CNI22 has asked EDTL to recruit local workers to be trained and employed by CNI22.

The company is not taking adequate measures to safeguard health, safety and environment, endangering both project workers and the local communities. EB observes that “the quality of workmanship is deteriorating” when EB is not on site, and that CNI22 does “no cohesive planning,” “safety practices are far below regulations” and acts with “environmental negligence.” EB’s September report lists 14 serious “issues of concern” and eight more “problems/issues,” but their recommendations to CNI22 are rarely implemented. Nothing is said about Government awareness or involvement in trying to improve the situation.

In March 2009, during the tender process for the consultancy that EB later received, La’o Hamutuk asked, “What authority will the Consultant have to compel compliance?” We warned that “the Government will be more effective in securing the Contractor’s commitment [to implement mitigation measures] than a Consultant will be.”

Legally required environmental clearances, right-of-way access permissions, environmental baseline survey and tree-cutting permits have not been done. CNI22 has not prepared a single monthly environmental report, although they have been required to do so since January 2010. Timorese workers receive less safety equipment than Chinese, and Chinese workers live in unsanitary, unsafe conditions. CNI22’s Health/Safety/Environment and Site Emergency plans “lack essential operational details” and need to be revised. The company has no formal process for complaints, has not replanted cleared areas, has no Solid Waste Management Plan, has not established buffer zones between residential and project areas, and has not complied with requirements for silt containment, oil and grease traps, sanitation facilities or waste treatment.

On 18 November, the Prime Minister misled Radio Timor-Leste listeners [listen to unedited Tetum] by telling them that La'o Hamutuk's information that the Government had cancelled CNI22's contract was incorrect, and then talked about transmission towers. The journalist talked about the purchase of Finnish generators weighing 250 tons (which should have been 250 megawatts generating capacity), but neither he nor the Prime Minister mentioned that the Government had taken the generating station contract away from CNI22 and assigned it to Puri Akraya Engineering two months earlier.

La’o Hamutuk is distressed that our dire predictions are being fulfilled, especially while the electricity situation in Dili and across the country becomes increasingly frustrating, and that public officials are concealing the extent of the project’s problems. Once again, we reiterate our call for transparent and accountable procedures consistent with law, public information, effective management and oversight, and well-considered planning and budgeting. When such practices are not followed, Timor-Leste not only wastes money and time, but loses opportunities to create infrastructure and develop our economy to improve our people’s lives.

Update 1: On 21 December, we posted the EB report for October, and wrote a new blog entry with some of the highlights.  Our web page includes media reactions and disinformation which emerged after this original posting, as well as a summary of project costs and the inconsistency between contractual obligations ($380 million in 2011) and the proposed 2011 State Budget ($166 million). 

Update 2: In January, Parliament increased the appropriation for this project in the 2011 State Budget to $447 million, raising questions about the sustainability of Timor-Leste's rapidly escalating expenditures. An order was placed with the Finnish company Wartsila for generators, and EB's November report highlighted scheduling and environmental problems. La'o Hamutuk will keep updating our web page to track ongoing developments.


Update 4: June 2011 - Audit confirms problems with electricity project

11 December 2010

Production Sharing Contracts now on-line

Oil and gas exploration activities in the Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) and in Timor-Leste Exclusive Area (TLEA) are conducted under Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) between the companies and the National Petroleum Authority or its predecessor, the TSDA. Under the 2005 Petroleum Act and the Interim Petroleum Mining Code, PSCs are public documents.

PSCs signed in 2006 were posted to government websites which have been allowed to die. Since these very important documents are no longer on the internet, La'o Hamutuk has posted them to our website. We encourage the government to implement their legal obligation for transparency.

10 December 2010

Making the oil companies pay what they owe

Timor-Leste is the most petroleum-export-dependent country in the world. Oil money pays for about 90% of everything the Government does. But the oil companies cheat – they pay as little as they can get away with. After six years, Timor-Leste is beginning to scrutinize their tax returns, and has discovered what should have been expected – that companies have not paid all that they owe.  We have already collected tens of millions in back taxes and penalties from ConocoPhillips and other companies, and further investigation is likely to reap much more.

La’o Hamutuk has posted an article to our website explaining the tax system and some of the difficulties and irregularities Timor-Leste has encountered, as well as some recent successes. This blog entry is a greatly abridged version of that 4-page article.

When taxes are calculated, the oil companies are entitled to deduct the expenses of operating the project through a process called cost recovery. This means that Timor-Leste effectively reimburses the company for expenses related to the project. There’s a lot of room for cheating. 

In November 2010, after several months of investigation, Timor-Leste sent a $32.4 million bill to ConocoPhillips (USA) and its joint venture (JV) partners Santos (Australia) and Inpex (Japan) for a cost the companies wrongly recovered from the Bayu-Undan project in 2005.

The illegitimate cost was for an exploratory well named Firebird (sometimes called Phoenix, the red circle on the map). In 2003 ConocoPhillips reassessed old data and concluded that there could be a valuable natural gas field west of and under the Bayu-Undan field.

Under their contracts, oil companies are required to give back parts of the contract area that they no longer want to explore, and they were supposed to relinquish the  pink area in 2004. The companies asked the Timor Sea Designated Authority (TSDA) regulator for time to drill one more well at Firebird, which they thought might contain 1.4 tcf of gas, about ¼ as much as Bayu-Undan.

The TSDA granted the extension in February 2004, but told the companies not to charge Firebird costs against Bayu-Undan revenues. They would only be able to recover these exploration costs if Firebird became a commercial project.

The Firebird well drilled at the end of 2005 found only small amounts of gas, and the well was plugged and abandoned. The companies relinquished the area.

Contrary to their agreement with TSDA, the companies charged the $32 million cost of the well against Bayu-Undan revenues, reducing their tax payment by $9.7 million.

Timor-Leste reopened this issue this year. On 24 November 2010, Timor-Leste ordered ConocoPhillips, Inpex and Santos to pay $32.4 million, including $9.7 million in back taxes, as well as a 100% penalty for gross negligence and 1% per month interest and penalties for late payment.

In early December, Inpex paid $7.1 million, Santos paid $5.1 million, and ConocoPhillips has agreed to pay $19.5 million (although the companies could still appeal within the Ministry of Finance).

Oil companies often buy and sell their ownership in different projects. If they get more for selling their shares than they spent on developing them, they have to pay capital gains tax, which is 30% in Timor-Leste. Although several such sales have occurred in the JPDA, the companies have not paid this tax. Current investigations are likely to produce payments for overdue taxes from Woodside, Santos and other companies, which is discussed in more detail on our website.

In December 2010, Timor-Leste’s National Directorate of Petroleum Revenues will begin to audit Bayu-Undan tax returns since 2005, the first time Timor-Leste has audited petroleum tax returns. External audits have turned up nothing, which is not surprising since the auditor has been paid by the companies. Timor-Leste has recently obliged the companies to keep copies of records in Timor-Leste, which will make audits possible.

Timor-Leste is the owner of the oil and gas in the ground, and it writes the contracts and the laws. For our people’s sake, we are glad that they are finally being enforced more effectively.